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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter having been transferred from the Supreme Court, the 
Court has jurisdiction to review the final judgment of the district court under 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Did Appellant Shayne E. Todd adequately challenge any of the 
grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment to the 
Appellee Utah Board of Pardons and Parole? 
2. Does Mr. Todd present any argument on appeal that is not 
squarely foreclosed by controlling precedent and/or the appellate record? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Any determinative provisions are provided in the text of the brief. 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case: In essence, Mr. Todd challenges the Board of 
Pardons and Parole's decision in 2001 and again in 2010 to schedule his next 
parole hearing in 2029, and the Board's role in parole decisions generally. 
Proceedings below: Several years after the Board set Mr. Todd's parole 
hearing date, he filed a petition for extraordinary relief in district court. 
Record (R.) 1-18. In relevant part, the Board moved for summary judgment 
and Mr. Todd responded (among numerous other filings). R. 320-422, 808-
840. 
Disposition: The trial court granted the Board summary judgment on 
the grounds that Mr. Todd's arguments already had been rejected in one of 
his prior appeals and/or by prior controlling decisions upholding the Board's 
authority to set parole within Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. R. 
1279-84. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Todd was serving a prison sentence for robbery, not set to expire 
until 2009, when the Board paroled him in 1999. R. 401, 605-06. As a 
condition of parole, Mr. Todd agreed to obey the law and not possess any 
firearms. R. 402. 
But within two weeks of being paroled, he shot his estranged wife point 
blank in the head as she clung to the driver-side door of an SUV he was 
2 
driving through a parking lot. State v. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, 11 5, 36-40, 
173 P.3d 170; R. 608, 636-37. The State subsequently charged him with 
murder and possession of a dangerous weapon. R. 337. Mr. Todd pied guilty 
to the weapons charge and a jury found him guilty of murder. R. 358, 374. 
Shortly before sentencing, Adult Probation and Parole completed a 
sentencing matrix form suggesting that Mr. Todd be imprisoned for 26.5 
years based on Utah's sentencing guidelines. R. 691.1 But considering all 
relevant factors, the trial court sentenced Mr. Todd to two prison terms: five 
years to life for murder and one to fifteen years for weapons possession. R. 
376, 397, 638-39. The court ordered the sentences for both crimes to run 
y;j consecutively to each other and to any other prior sentences Mr. Todd was 
already serving. Id. Consequently, the murder and weapons sentences 
would not begin until after his robbery sentence expired in 2009. See, e.g., R. 
405. 
Soon after the sentencing, the Board held a parole revocation hearing, 
attended by Mr. Todd and his counsel, in April 2001. R. 405, 646, 649. Mr. 
Todd acknowledged receiving the Board's disclosure file prior to the hearing. 
R. 651. Adult Probation and Parole recommended that Mr. Todd's parole 
1 The matrix form doesn't reveal who completed it but this Court previously 
stated that Adult Probation and Parole prepared the sentencing report 
estimating Mr. Todd would serve 26.5 years in prison. State v. Todd, 2013 
UT App 231, 1 3, 312 P.3d 936. 
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(from the robbery sentence) be revoked and that he never be paroled again. 
R. 65 7. After the hearing, the Board revoked his parole from the robbery 
sentence and noted that his weapons sentence would not expire until 2024 
(fifteen years after his robbery sentence expired) and that his murder 
sentence was life. R. 405. The Board set the next parole hearing for 2029 
and provided Mr. Todd a rationale sheet indicating the aggravating and 
mitigating factors behind its decision. R. 406.2 
Mr. Todd then challenged his murder conviction and sentence in the 
appellate courts. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed his murder conviction 
"in light of the overwhelming evidence of [his] guilt." Todd, 2007 UT App 
349, ,r 51. The Court later affirmed the denial of any post-conviction relief. 
Todd v. State, 2011 UT App 313, 262 P.3d 1222. 
In the meantime. Mr. Todd also tried to persuade the Board to hold his 
next parole hearing sooner than 2029. He wrote letters to the Board in 2003 
and 2004. R. 675-77, 678-83. He apparently also asked the prison's Offender 
Management Team (OMR) in 2010 to submit to the Board information 
supporting an earlier parole hearing date based on his conduct in prison. R. 
408, 413. OMR's subsequent report made a referral to the Board for an 
2 The Director of the Bureau of Planning and Research at the Department of 
Corrections advised Mr. Todd in 2003 that convicted murderers are rarely released 
from prison and that it was "highly likely you will never be released from prison, 
since your most serious offense is a 'life' top, and the court has ordered consecutive 
terms for your convicted offenses." R. 583. 
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earlier hearing date while noting that the time matrix for Mr. Todd's 
sentences was "300 months" not including the robbery sentence. R. 413. 
In late 2010, the Board reviewed OMR's report and declined to change 
_.,; the parole hearing date from 2029. R. 416. The Board's order then listed Mr. 
Todd's relevant crimes and sentences along with their respective expiration 
dates: (1) robbery, a "1-15" year sentence that expired on June 9, 2009; (2) 
murder, a "5-100" year sentence set to expire on May 28, 2107; and (3) 
weapons possession, a "1-15" year sentence set to expire on May 13, 2120.3 R. 
416, 695. 
Mr. Todd initially challenged the Board's decision by filing a motion to 
correct an illegal sentence under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e). 
State v. Todd, 2013 UT App 231, 11 1-3, 312 P.3d 936. He argued the Board 
had modified his life sentence, improperly set a definite term on his 
indeterminate sentence, and violated due process by setting a parole date 
beyond the sentence recommended by the Guidelines. Id. 115-8. This Court 
rejected his arguments on the merits or as not properly raised. Id. 
Undeterred, Mr. Todd appears to have repeated or repackaged the 
same basic arguments into a petition for extraordinary relief challenging the 
Board's decision to keep his parole hearing date in 2029. The Board moved 
3 The Board initially issued an order with incorrect expirations dates for Mr. Todd's 
sentences but fixed the mistake by issuing another order with corrected dates. R. 
693-95. 
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for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Mr. Todd timely 
filed this appeal. R. 1312. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Todd challenges the Board's decision setting his parole hearing for 
2029. The district court granted summary judgment against him because his 
claims are barred by issue preclusion and by controlling precedent. The 
district court also refused to address a due process argument that Mr. Todd 
had not timely raised. As the Appellant, he bears the burden to offer facts 
and law showing how the district court erred. But Mr. Todd never appears to 
do so. The Court can affirm on this ground alone. 
Aside from this threshold problem, Mr. Todd's various arguments on 
appeal fail for one or more reasons. First, Utah appellate courts have 
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the State's indeterminate 
sentencing system and the Board's authority to determine actual time served. 
Second, Mr. Todd has no liberty interest in the sentencing guidelines, nor has 
the Board deprived him of any alleged interest in being released from prison 
within the guidelines' recommendations. Third, the Board's rationale sheet 
adequately explains its decision. Fourth, there are no legal or factual 
grounds for this Court to review the Board's internal operating procedures 
about which Mr. Todd complains. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the district court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness. Olsen v. Fair Co., 2016 UT App 46, 16,369 P.3d 473; Wellborn 
v. Bd. of Pardons and Parole, 2010 UT App 230, para. 3 (per curiam) 
(unpublished). 
The Board's decisions are generally not subject to judicial review. Utah 
Code § 77-27-5(3). But it is nonetheless well established that courts may use 
an extraordinary writ to review the Board's decisions in two narrow 
circumstances: to correct "a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion," Renn v. 
Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995), and to assure that 
J procedural due process was not denied, Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 
870 P.2d 902, 909-13 (Utah 1993). Importantly, judicial review addresses 
only "the fairness of the process by which the Board undertakes its 
J 
sentencing function," not the result. Padilla v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & 
Parole, 947 P.2d 664, 667 (Utah 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The Board has exclusive authority to determine the actual number of years a 
defendant serves, Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994), and the 
...) court does not "sit as a panel of review on the result, absent some other 
constitutional claim." Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 
(Utah 1994). 
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While courts afford prose appellants like Mr. Todd every reasonable 
consideration, they are still held to the same standard as any qualified 
member of the bar and must present coherent arguments supported by the 
record and the law. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ,r 19, 128 P.3d 1171; Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9). This is particularly appropriate for an experienced pro se 
litigant like Mr. Todd. See, e.g., Todd v. Sorenson, 2015 UT App 87, 348 P.3d 
350 (Mr. Todd representing himself); Todd, 2011 UT App 313 (Mr. Todd 
representing himself). 
ARGUMENT 
Although Mr. Todd's arguments are sometimes difficult to follow, his 
overarching complaint remains clear-he's mad the Board won't hold his 
parole hearing until 2029. So he challenges the Board authority to determine 
release dates. He argues the Board should be bound by the sentencing 
guidelines. He questions the rationales behind the Board's decision. And he 
asserts the Board's internal operating procedures are deficient. 
But for all his briefing, he never really explains why the district court's 
specific holdings are wrong. And his arguments are contrary to binding 
precedent and the record. The district court's decision should be affirmed. 
Mr. Todd presents no valid reason to overturn that judgment, much less any 
reason to reject controlling case law. 
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I. Mr. Todd Fails To Show How The District Court Erred 
The district court granted summary judgment against Mr. Todd for two 
reasons: his arguments are barred by (1) issue preclusion and/or (2) existing 
case law. Order at 2-5; R. 1280-83. The court also determined that Mr. Todd 
failed to properly raise a procedural due process issue. Order at 4 n.4; R. 
1282 n.4. The Court should deny Mr. Todd any appellate relief because he 
never explains how the district court erred in its determinations. 
First, the district court correctly held that Mr. Todd's arguments were 
the same ones that this Court already adjudicated and rejected in a prior 
appeal affirming the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Order 
..,; at 2-3; R. 1280-81 (citing Todd, 2013 UT App 231, ,r,r 7-8). Accordingly, the 
court held the arguments were barred by issue preclusion. Id. While Mr. 
Todd's brief discusses some general issue preclusion principles, Aplt's Br. at 
11-13, he never explains-as far as Appellee can tell-how the district court 
misapplied the doctrine to his arguments (e.g., showing the specific issues he 
preserved below that were not already adjudicated in his prior appeal 
addressing his motion to correct illegal sentence). If anything, Mr. Todd's 
brief confirms the district court's conclusion that his arguments retread the 
same old ground. He not only asks this Court to reverse its opinion from his 
prior appeal, Aplt's Br. at 11 (which is only necessary because he's pressing 
the same arguments), but also claims that his petition "asserts a good case 
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[of] illegal prison sentence," Aplt's Br. at 14, the very relief he unsuccessfully 
sought in his prior appeal. See, e.g., Todd, 2013 UT App 231, ,, 3-4. 
Second, the district court also correctly concluded that Mr. Todd's 
complaints about the indeterminate sentencing system and the reviewability 
of Board decisions were "the same arguments he has made before" and had 
already been rejected by controlling precedents. Order at 4: R. 1282 (citing 
cases rejecting Mr. Todd's arguments). Again, Mr. Todd does not explain how 
the district court erred in so holding. Just as he did below, Mr. Todd "fails to 
demonstrate that the Board of Pardons took any action that has not been 
approved by the legislator drafters of the challenged statutes, or that has not 
been discussed in the case law that came before him." Order at 5; R. 1283. 
Finally, the district court properly declined to address Mr. Todd's due 
process claims (that he didn't receive all the documents the Board relied on at 
his parole hearing and that he couldn't speak at the hearing) because he 
failed to raise them until his summary judgment response. Order at 4 n.4, 5 
n.5; R. 1282 n.4, 1283 n.5. As far as Appellee can tell, Mr. Todd never 
explains how the district court's ruling on this issue was wrong, much less 
shows (via citations to the record or underlying pleadings) that he timely 
raised this issue for the court's consideration. Instead, he baldly reasserts his 
due process argument on appeal (in a section that merely mentions "plain 
error"). Aplt's Br. at 1, 4, 28-29. But he doesn't explain how plain error 
10 
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possibly helps him here, nor how his argument survives the uncontested fact 
that he and his attorney had notice of the hearing and he acknowledged 
receiving the Board's disclosure file beforehand. R. 648-51. 
As the appellant, Mr. Todd had the burden to argue facts and law 
showing the district court's holdings were wrong. See, e.g., Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). He hasn't met this burden. The district court can be affirmed on 
this ground alone. 
II. Mr. Todd's Arguments Are Contrary To The Law And Facts 
Aside from Mr. Todd's failure to adequately challenge the district 
court's conclusions, all of his arguments on appeal are contradicted by settled 
law and/or the record facts. His various assertions and complaints boil down 
to four basic arguments: (1) the indeterminate sentencing system and the 
Board's authority to determine actual time served are incompatible or 
unconstitutional, (2) the sentencing guidelines limit the Board's authority to 
set parole hearings, (3) the Board didn't sufficiently justify its decision, and 
(4) the Board's internal operating procedures are inadequate. None of these 
arguments withstand scrutiny. 
A. The indeterminate sentencing system and the Board's 
parole authority are constitutional. 
Mr. Todd makes various arguments attacking the State's 
indeterminate sentencing system and/or the Board's almost unreviewable 
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authority to determine how long the prisoner actually serves within the 
sentenced range. See, e.g., Aplt's Br. at 12-13, 31-32. But, as the district 
court noted, the relevant statutes and Utah's sentencing/parole system have 
been repeatedly upheld by Utah courts. Order at 4; R. 1282 (citing State v. 
Telford, 2002 UT 51, 48 P.3d 228; Padilla v. Bd. of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664 
(Utah 1997); Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994); Foote v. Bd. of 
Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991); Jones v. Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 2009 
UT App 142, *1 (per curiam) (unpublished)). Mr. Todd neither explains why 
these precedents do not control here nor offers any novel, coherent theories 
undermining the current system's constitutionality. 
B. The sentencing guidelines are not binding nor implicated 
here 
Most of Mr. Todd's arguments revolve around the unfounded notion 
that the sentencing guidelines-and their recommendation that he serve 26.5 
years in prison-created a liberty interest of which he was deprived by the 
Board's decision to schedule his next parole hearing in 2029. See, e.g., Br. at 
6-9, 24, 33. There are two major flaws with this argument. 
First, the Supreme Court has already rejected "the concept that the 
Guidelines create a liberty interest or an 'expectation of release."' Monson v. 
Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1023 (Utah 1996); see also Preece, 886 P.2d at 511 
("The state sentencing guidelines used by the board of pardons do not have 
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the force and effect of law. Consequently, any 'expectation of release' derived 
from the guidelines is at best tenuous." (internal citation omitted)). 
Moreover, the sentencing matrix form states explicitly that "[t]hese are 
. .J guidelines only. They do not create any right or expectation on behalf of the 
offender." R. 691. 
Second, even if the guidelines somehow created a liberty interest, that 
interest wasn't deprived by the Board. The 26.5 year estimate applied only to 
Mr. Todd's murder and weapons sentences. R. 691. The district court 
ordered those sentences to run consecutive to any other sentences Mr. Todd 
was serving. R. 376, 397, 638-39. Because he was already serving a robbery 
...J sentence, the murder and weapons sentence did not even commence until mid 
2009. See, e.g., R. 405, 416. Thus, even if the guidelines' 26.5 year estimate 
was binding, the earliest Mr. Todd could have expected to be released was 
late 2035. The Board's decision to set his parole hearing six years earlier, in 
2029, does not in any way deprive him of that purported expectation. 
All of Mr. Todd's guidelines-related arguments fail on the law and the 
facts. 
C. The Board's rationale sheet adequately explains its 
reasoning 
Mr. Todd also argues that the Board's rationale sheet doesn't help him 
understand why the Board set his next hearing in 2029. Aplt's Br. at 23, 29-
13 
30. But whatever complaints he has about the Board's explanation, the 
Supreme Court held that "the rationale sheets used by the Board to explain 
its parole decision [are] adequate" and satisfy due process. Padilla, 947 P.2d 
at 670. Mr. Todd has not cited any contrary authority or explained why that 
precedent does not apply to the rationale sheet in this case. 
D. There is no reason to review the Board's internal 
operating procedures. 
Mr. Todd spends several pages complaining about the Board's alleged 
internal operating procedures-the fallibility of case analysts, lack of quality 
control systems, record keeping, etc. Aplt's Br. at 20-23, 33.4 But these 
arguments aren't relevant. The Court, as noted, can review the board's 
decision only to ensure due process and rectify flagrant abuses of discretion. 
Mr. Todd waived any argument that his parole hearing lacked minimum due 
process, nor does the record support such an argument. Moreover, he 
presents no valid argument that the Board has somehow abused its 
discretion. Indeed, "so long as the period of incarceration decided upon by the 
board of pardons falls within an inmate's applicable indeterminate range, 
e.g., five years to life, then that decision, absent unusual circumstances, 
cannot be arbitrary and capricious." Preece, 886 P.2d at 512. That is 
precisely what happened here. 
4 The district court did not address this argument and it's not clear that Mr. 
Todd preserved it below. The Board nonetheless addresses it on appeal. 
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The Board's internal operating procedures are not "unusual 
circumstances" justifying review by this Court or requiring the Board to 
grant an earlier parole hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the district court's 
decision granting summary judgment to the Board and dismissing Mr. Todd's 
Petition for Extraodinary Relief. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Deputy Solicitor General 
Amanda N. Montague (9941) 
Assistant Attorney General 
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